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Conversion of foreign debt is an economic policy 
instrument of both positive and negative potential 
for the regional economy. The positive potential 
includes reduction of the cumulative value of the debt 
and of the interest payments, improvement of the 
financial situation of enterprises, repatriation of fug-
itive capital, and direct foreign investment in prior-
ity sectors. The negative potential includes a net 
adverse effect on the balance of payments, increased 
inflation resulting from increased issue of money, 
denationalization of the economy using subsidized 
capital, and crowding out in the use of foreign 
exchange. The final mix resulting from conversion is 
determined mainly by the modalities with which this 
tool is used. 
The selection of these modalities ought to be 
designed to satisfy the national economic priorities, 
which do not necessarily coincide with those of the 
groups pushing for the conversion. There is a dis-
juncture, for example, between the big banks, which 
are concerned above all to reduce their risks in the 
region, and the countries, which are seeking to renew 
the inflow of net external financing. The same situa-
tion exists between transnational corporations, 
which want to make profits from the subsidized 
purchase of existing assets, and the countries, which 
want additional investment ín sectors producing 
tradeable goods. Thus, conversion of external debt is 
a technique requiring, for its correct use, clarity of 
goals and fine-tuning in implementation, 
Conversion has little effect on the position of 
the regional foreign debt. Perhaps its greatest signif-
icance in this respect is the recognition by the banks 
that the present value of the debt is different from, 
and lower than, the official value. 
•liCLAC consultant. This article is based on the study 
prepared by the author for the Latin American Economic 
System (SIÍLA) and used in the discussion of this topic at the 
International Economic Workshop of the Economic 
Research Corporation for Latin America (CIt-PLAN). The 
author is grateful for the comments of Robert Devlin, 
Nicolás Eyzaguirre, Alicia Frohmann, Roberto Zahier and 
the members of the Joint ÍXI.AC/CTC Unit on Transna-
tional Corporations, but they are not responsible for the 
content of this article. 
Introduction 
The purpose of this article is to analyse and 
evaluate the modalities of converting Latin 
America's foreign debt into share equity or 
financing for other activities in the region. The 
situation is examined from the standpoint of the 
Latin American economy. The adoption of this 
standpoint rules out any in-depth discussion of 
other assessments, such as those of banks, multi-
lateral bodies and governments of the central 
countries. This method has been chosen in order 
to keep the article short and achieve a more 
focussed analysis. In any event, studies made 
from the other standpoints are legion. 
The conversion of foreign debt should be 
analysed against the background of the crisis 
which has been affecting the external financial 
sector of Latin America since 1982. Since that 
year —and unlike what happened in the 1930 
crisis— the continued payment of the interest on 
the foreign debt became, with a few exceptions, 
the new consensus of the region's macroeco-
nomic management. This consensus was to 
some extent involuntary and imposed by exter-
nal circumstances: between January 1983 and 
September 1986 a committee of bankers co-
ordinated 93% of the commitment of long-term 
bank loans for Latin America, and these loans 
were made in the context of debt rescheduling 
agreements (OECD, 1987, and IMF, 1987). There 
is a very marked contrast between the 1930s 
situation, characterized by the wide dispersal of 
bond holders, and the present control exercised 
by a handful of banks. 
The implementation of severe recessionary 
adjustments, including the radical reduction of 
imports which artificially produced a positive 
trade balance incompatible with full employ-
ment, facilitated a continued net transfer abroad, 
which amounted to US$130 000 million by the 
end of 1986 (SELA, 1987). Real wages and 
employment fell, and inflation rose. 
In the more concrete area of the foreign debt, 
several governments of the region took steps 
designed to obtain positive results in the 
decade's main variable: the continued payment 
of an external debt which was unpayable on its 
official terms. These measures included 
exchange rate insurance for borrowers, cancella-
tion in advance, State backing of private foreign 
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debt, and the conversion of foreign debt, the 
topic of this study. 
The topic of conversion of foreign debt lies 
at a thematic crossroads, involving mainly direct 
foreign investment but also monetary policy and 
the flight of capital. It allows of many modalities, 
and some of the resulting differences are merely 
formal or of secondary importance; others, how-
ever, modify substantially the effect of conver-
sion on the different macroeconomic variables. 
It is thus necessary to establish a typology of 
conversion schemes. 
1. What is conversion? 
Capitalization of a debt is a long-established 
financial operation which represents the concre-
tion of the risk incurred by the debtor in the 
event of non-payment of a debt. When a debt 
obligation is not met it is normal for the collat-
eral to be used as a means of liquidating the 
financial obligation; this collateral often consists 
of participation in the equity of some commer-
cial operation of the debtor. These modalities are 
common in local loans but they have not yet 
occurred in the case of public loans, where it is 
simply a question of a State guarantee. Problems 
can also arise in the private sector when this 
capitalization implies the transfer of assets to 
foreign factors. The crisis in Latin America's 
external financial sector and the subsequent 
creation of a secondary market for doubtful loan 
instruments have opened up this possibility. 
The market value of a loan contract is the 
current value of the expectation of payment 
being made according to the terms of the con-
tract. In the majority of cases the contractual 
value will be a little higher than the market value 
in order to cover the risk of non-payment. When 
the creditor and the debtor have a legal residence 
in the same country, any conflict that may arise is 
resolved in the courts by means of bankruptcy 
proceedings. When this is not the case, the deb-
tor's difficulty in obtaining new financing is due 
to the fact that the potential creditors wül be 
obliged to share the anticipated loss (the differ-
ence between the market value of the obligation 
This study consists of four parts. The first 
describes conversion in general terms, the 
second analyses each individual country in which 
it is used. The third part evaluates the impact of 
conversion on the following aspects of Latin 
America's economy: balance of payments, direct 
foreign investment, laundering of capital, local 
finances and foreign control of the national 
economy. The fourth and last part draws some 
conclusions and outlines various possibilities 
with respect to this topic. 
and ¡ts contractual value). The attitude of the 
creditors will be influenced by the market value 
of the debt as well as by the willingness or ability 
of the debtor to meet his obligations (Dooley, 
1987, p. 7). 
The idea of converting debt into equity is 
also used in the reorganization of bankrupt 
enterprises: part of the debt is converted into 
shares in the company, and this reduces the debt 
and the interest payments. The creditors receive 
shares and if the company recovers and 
prospers, they will obtain profits, as happened in 
the case of Chrysler (Weinart, 1986/1987, 
p. 89). 
There are various types of capitalization. 
The simplest one is when the debtor and creditor 
entities form part of one and the same enter-
prise, as happens in a transnational corporation. 
The situation is more complicated when the 
creditor is a different company, a bank for exam-
ple. Both cases occur in current commercial prac-
tice. However, there is a third possibility: the 
formation of a common debt fund from which an 
agent can select any instrument for capitaliza-
tion in assets of his choice in the debtor country. 
This implies a deliberate policy. 
2. Mechanism of the conversion 
Most of the conversion systems assume the pur-
chase of a foreign obligation by a local or foreign 
agent —an investor if he subsequently invests— 
or by a commercial bank. The agent then 
changes this obligation into local currency with 
I 
Characteristics of conversion 
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the central bank —at or a little below its nominal 
value— or into a debt instrument in local cur-
rency which can be traded in the local bond 
market. The original debt is thus extinguished 
(Sloakes, 1986, pp. 40 and 41). The proceeds of 
this transaction can be used to purchase an equity 
participation in a local enterprise, to increase the 
plant and equipment expenditure of an existing 
enterprise, to extinguish pending obligations in 
the local currency and improve the enterprise's 
cash flow, or for any other legal purpose. 
Conversion of foreign debt therefore implies 
the purchase — by local residents or foreign 
investors— of obligations of the debtor country 
in foreign currency at a given discount rate and 
their conversion into the local currency at a 
lower discount rate. In the case of residents, the 
operation can amount to a repatriation of capi-
tal. Agents thus obtain funds in local currency 
which they can use for authorized purposes. 
These funds are cheaper than those obtained in 
the official exchange market and in the parallel 
market (World Financial Markets, September 
1986, p. 8). 
Table 1 shows the market quotations of the 
foreign debt notes of several countries and their 
variation since June 1985. Its complement is the 
discount rate applicable to these notes. The price 
is a reference price, since this is a very opaque 
market which carries out many more operations 
than are published, and at different prices. 
This discount is justified mainly by the doubt 
as to Latin America's payment of its foreign debt 
at its nominal value. The doubt is based on the 
difficulty of continuing both the transfer abroad 
of part of the region's product and the imple-
mentation of recessionary adjustments. The 
generation of trade surpluses is also encounter-
ing growing difficulties. All these factors have 
joined with the lack of an alternative plan for 
positive adjustment, which would enable Latin 
America to restructure its economy and continue 
to develop, to create a situation of partial non-
payment of the debt. Eight countries of the 
region, including Brazil, have suspended or 
imposed conditions on their foreign debt pay-
ments. Although hardly anyone expects a gen-
eral moratorium, the North American banks are 
already envisaging a reduction of payments, and 
this has been reflected in the selling price of the 
shares of the biggest banks, which has fallen by 
60% in relation to the market price. The market 
was already applying discounts even before 
Citicorp increased its reserves (Fortune, 30 May 
1987). 
The conversion operations carried out in the 
region total US$4 895 million (table 2). 
3. Agents 
Many different kinds of banks have been selling 
discounted debt. In the beginning it was mainly 
banks with only small amounts invested in 
doubtful debts which they wanted to reduce or 
eliminate from their portfolios; others wanted 
to exchange one type of financial investment for 
another; and others which had taken precautions 
against losses and could absorb the discounted 
sale. They were mainly European and Japanese 
banks, but among them were a few North 
American regional banks. The big United States 
banks continued to count these debts at their 
parity value, for if they sold debt at a discount 
they would have to recognize the loss and use it 
to punish the other loans in the country in ques-
tion. These banks engaged in a lot of brokerage, 
but they did not feed the market with the instru-
ments they held. 
As capitalization business has increased, 
these banks have changed their attitude and are 
participating ever more actively in this market, 
crowding other intermediaries out of it and in 
some cases selling their own notes. This has 
happened in the case of Citibank, Bankers Trust, 
Libra Bank and the Bank of Montreal (Fortune, 
March 1987). The Industrial Bank of Japan and 
Sumitomo have been active in Japan. 
The situation was given a jolt when in May 
Citicorp announced that in direct relation to its 
doubtful loans it was increasing its reserves by 
US$3 000 million. This decision unleashed a 
wave of similar moves by the other main United 
States banks and it perhaps marked a turning 
point in Latin America's financial relations with 
the banks. Citicorp is now in a better negotiating 
position both with Latin America and with the 
United States Government. The main conse-
quences with respect to debt conversion is that, 
at least for Citicorp, lending new money just to 
ensure continued payment of the interest on the 
debt has become a thing of the past. Among 
other things, this produced a large increase in 
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the supply of foreign debt instruments for con-
version. At his press conference on 19 May the 
President of Citicorp announced that for the 
next three years it was expected that US$1 000 
million of the expanded reserve would be used to 
cover losses resulting from the conversion dis-
count. These losses would range between 
US$2 000 and US$3 000 million in those years, 
depending on the discount. As the President of 
Citicorp said: "we are not going to get anywhere 
by giving out new 20-year loans subject to all 
kinds of restructuring... Today it is a much better 
idea to invest in a profitable company in, say, 
Brazil than to keep lending money to the Central 
Bank of that country... In the next few years we 
are going to try to relocate and capitalize a large 
part of the money we are owed... We will invest 
in anything that is economically advisable... We 
are even ready to withdraw our investment if 
somebody is interested in buying our share ten 
years from now. This is because we dot not want 
to be long-term capital investors" (Reed, 1987). 
Table 1 
VALUE OF FOREIGN DEBT NOTES, BY COUNTRY 





















































































Source: June 1985 to December 1986: Shearson, Lehman Brothers, Loan transactions group. The Economist, London, 21 March 1987; 
February 1987: Fortune, 30 March 1987 and Shearson Lehman Brothers, op.cit,; March 1987: Business latin America, 20 April 
1987. 
"May 1986, R. Dornbusch, T¿£? debt problem and some proposed solutions, Cambridge, Mass., Massachussetslntituteof Technology, 1986. 
Table 2 
FOUR LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES: AMOUNTS OF 
FOREIGN DEBT CAPITALIZATION 







































Source: Official information for each country. 
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This event illustrates perfectly the diver-
gence between the interest of the banks which 
take this attitude and the interest of Latin Amer-
ica. The banks' second-best solution is not what 
was expected of them as their main activity by 
the countries of the region. Secretary of State 
Baker said that a counterpart of the new funds 
envisaged in the Baker Plan was the creation of a 
more favourable environment for foreign 
investment. The banks decided to take a short 
cut: to acquire the goods without lending the 
money. Of course, not all the banks will copy the 
Citicorp strategy; we will have to see what 
happens. 
Other conversion agents are local or foreign 
financiers who want to invest, finance produc-
tive and other operations, repatriate capital or 
use profitably the foreign exchange that they 
keep in the country. A small group of big com-
mercial and merchant banks, together with 
firms of lawyers or intermediaries, are earning 
fat commissions by matching up the supply and 
demand for notes. A swarm of intermediaries, 
advisers, economic and political analysts and 
public relations men has thus appeared on the 
scene. Even the New York Times (5 May 1987) 
has mentioned the interest of these banks and 
firms as one of the driving forces of conversion. 
4. Theoretical advantages of conversion 
From the standpoint of the creditor banks, to sell 
debt notes at a price lower than their face value 
ensures the partial payment of a doubtful debt 
(hence the discount) and enables them to reduce 
or alter the percentage of investments in a coun-
try or region. 
The creditor banks which sell the notes 
improve their portfolios, eliminate their 
exposed debts and obtain a partial advance pay-
ment of a doubtful debt. On the other hand, if 
they sell the notes to third parties, they accept 
that the risk for which they had charged a higher 
interest rate when they made the loan actually 
occurred. If they carry out the transaction 
directly, they exchange a financial asset for a real 
asset; they can thus improve their position, for 
100 units of doubtful debt are converted into 
95-100 units of the better local assets, which are 
profitable to boot and can be sold a few years 
later with a gain. This operation is usually too 
complex for the small banks to carry out. By 
cancelling the original debt, the bank gains a 
greater degree of freedom with respect to the 
countries, and this —in the case of Latin 
America— enables it to get rid of the burden of 
this chain of debtors. 
The agent obtains local financing at a lower 
cost than in the local market and at less than it 
would cost him to bring in foreign exchange 
from abroad and change it in either the official 
market or the free market. The transactions fol-
low the ups and downs of the relationships 
between discounts, commissions and the 
exchange rate differential. 
For the local firms which want to reduce 
their debt in the local currency, this system is a 
cheap way of improving the flow of funds and 
increasing the firms' profitability, with a view to 
financing a future expansion. A country which 
authorizes the capitalization of its foreign debt 
obtains the resulting reduction of the volume of 
this debt and of the annual interest payments, 
and this is achieved with an actual payment 
smaller than the face value of the instruments in 
question. 
Not all the legal terminations are directly 
productive. Furthermore, it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to avoid running foul of some of the 
banks —such as the one on recycling of used 
dollars. The multilateral financial bodies have 
supported debt capitalization as a partial solu-
tion to the problem of a possible moratorium. 
According to recent statements by David Mul-
ford, United States Under-Secretary of the 
Treasury, the United States Government openly 
supports this initiative and it is part of the Baker 
Plan. 
It would thus seem to be a faultless solution 
which leaves everybody happy. This swapping of 
a debt for an asset warrants the unanimous 
approval of foreign creditors, international 
banks, transnational corporations, central banks 
and the financial systems of a number of Latin 
American countries, the International Monetary 
Fund, the World Bank and the United States 
Government. Everyone seems to gain from con-
version, but to see whether this is really so it will 
be necessary to examine its real terms and 
results; this will be done in the following section. 
Table 3 
EIGHT LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES: CHARACTERISTICS OF FOREIGN DEBT CONVERSION PROGRAMMES 
Argentina Brazil Costa Rica Chile Ecuador Philippines Mexico Venezuela 
GENERAL ASPECTS 
Date of programme start-up May 1987 December 1982 August 1986 May 1985 December 1986 August 1986 April 1986 April 1987 
June 1984 
Type of convertible debt 











Priority investment sectors 
Purchase of assets 
Application of foreign 
investment mies 
Need to bring in new funds 
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Conditions for repatriation 
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Public 
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Banks. TNCs. firms 
IS$2 000 million in 5 
years 
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Not for 3 years in prio-
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Investment, payment of Investment, payment of 
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Banks. TNCs, 
individuals 
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than interest 
Not for 12 years 










Not more than 10% for 
3 years 
Not for 5 years. Not 
more than 12.5% in 
next 6 years 
Operation in stock market No No No Under study No No 
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II 
The conversion as such 
1. Background 
The systems of foreign debt conversion have 
much in common but also large differences 
(table 3). The debt to be converted is both public 
and private in most cases, but in Argentina and 
Mexico it is only public, whereas in Ecuador it is 
only private. The accepted uses of the local cur-
rency funds include exchange for assets in all 
cases but also payment of local debt in Chile, 
Mexico and Venezuela. The agents are usually 
banks and transnational corporations, but local 
enterprises and individuals may make transac-
tions in several cases. Several countries have not 
set any limit on the extent of the system, but 
Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, Philippines and Mex-
ico have done so, for a potential total of 
US$20 800 million. Most of the countries have 
not set any time-limits, except for Argentina, 
Chile and Mexico. The official exchange rate or 
some variant of it is usually used. The means of 
payment is usually the local currency on bonds or 
both. The swap price is usually the nominal 
value of the notes, except in Costa Rica where it 
cannot exceed 70% thereof, and Mexico where it 
fluctuates between 70 and 100%. 
Most of the countries have priority invest-
ment sectors, but not Brazil, Chile and Ecuador. 
In most of the countries it is also possible to buy 
assets, but not in Argentina and Ecuador. The 
usual foreign investment rules are generally 
applicable, but not in Chile and Mexico. With the 
exception of Argentina, there is no obligation to 
put in new funds, nor is there any incompatibil-
ity with other promotion schemes. Almost all 
the countries impose some time-limit on remit-
tance of profits and repatriation of capital. 
Lastly, no country so far allows debt conver-
sion funds to be used in the stock market. 
2. The implementation of the system 
by countries^ 
a) Brazil 
Law 4131 on foreign investments authorizes 
the conversion of loans into equity. During the 
1980s in Latin America Brazil pioneered the 
implementation of a system for swapping debt 
for equity; in December 1982 fiscal incentives 
were introduced to promote conversion, includ-
ing tax cuts from 5 to 10%. These were revoked 
in June 1984. 
Brazil also has the largest amount of con-
verted debt: US$1 926 million. Most of this 
amount is accounted for by transnational corpo-
rations which have transformed into share capi-
tal their foreign debt with the corporation's 
subsidiaries, subject to the restrictions contained 
in the foreign investment regulations. The repa-
triation of the capital was confined to the terms 
of the original loan, eight years in most cases 
(Business America, 19 January 1987, p. 3, and 
IMF, 1987). However, this procedure has also 
been used by transnational corporations to remit 
profits (Business Latin America, 27 June 1984, 
p. 204, and Euromoney, August 1986, p. 69)-
From June 1984 conversion was confined to 
the direct equity of the debtor in intra-company 
loans and international and external loans gua-
ranteed by the parent company. At the begin-
ning of 1985 the tax allowance was likewise 
restricted. 
The programme had a moderate inflationary 
impact while it lasted, for no steps were taken to 
neutralize the increase in money in circulation 
(Marques Moreira, 1986). It was finally discon-
tinued in early 1986, although some transactions 
are still carried out on the basis of case by case 
approval (The Economist, 7 May 1987). 
The Central Bank is at present considering 
the possibility of re-authorizing capitalization. 
The new conversion plan is encountering pow-
erful political resistance and its details are still 
not known. However, there is speculation that 
the purchase value of the discounted notes will 
range between 65 and 100% of the nominal 
value, depending on the investment and the 
region. It will be possible to use the resulting 
local currency only for new investments or for 
capital widening and not as working capital for 
the payment of local debt. 
The programme will include special incen-
tives for firms which carry out swap transactions 
'The countries are taken in the chronological order in which 
they began to implement the system. 
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for exports. Remittance of the profits of these 
firms will be based on a percentage of the net 
exports and not of the equity. Investment in 
shares using conversion funds may also be auth-
orized, as Brazil's stock market is the largest in 
the debtor countries (Business Latin America, 27 
April 1987). 
b) Chile 
In May 1985 the Central Bank of Chile estab-
lished two methods of converting external pub-
lic debt and private guaranteed debt in different 
chapters of the Law on International Exchanges: 
chapter XVIII, covering only local transactions, 
and chapter XIX which covers overseas ones as 
well. The Chilean programme has the highest 
rate of debt conversion in relation to its cumula-
tive value (5%). In both systems foreign debts 
with terms longer than 365 days can be used for 
conversion into assets, debt payments in local 
currency and other activities in Chile. 
Except in the case of a bank which uses its 
assets in Chile for the transaction, the notes are 
bought at a discount in the secondary interna-
tional market. Before making the conversion the 
agent makes an application to the Central Bank 
for approval in a funds proposal. The conversion 
is made at the current dollar exchange rate. Once 
the application has been approved, the note is 
exchanged for national currency or bonds 
expressed in national currency at a nominal 
value. Under chapter XVIII the Central Bank 
keeps a commission of about 16%, which is not 
the case under chapter XIX. The foreign debt is 
thus cancelled. Most of the debt is converted into 
financial instruments, which are later sold at a 
discount in the local market to obtain national 
currency. The current discount is 10 to 15%. 
According to information from the Economics 
Ministry, the limit imposed on the programme 
by the government is between US$2 000 and 
US$4 000 million (Euromoney, August 1986). 
Chapter XVIII authorizes individuals and enter-
prises to buy with their own foreign exchange 
foreign debt instruments with terms longer than 
365 days. Prior agreement between the pur-
chaser and the debtor is required for the acquisi-
tion of instruments, for the obligation will be 
immediately payable in Chile on delivery of the 
document. This agreement is not required for 
notes of the Central Bank, which can be swapped 
directly for negotiable instruments expressed in 
units of investment at a discount of 3% of the 
original value. The principal of this instrument 
will have a term of 10 years and the interest will 
be payable quarterly. 
The amount of these transactions may not 
exceed the principal or the balance of the debt in 
the original instrument plus the respective 
interest. 
A local agent, through a foreign agent, 
locates suitable Chilean external debt and buys it 
at a discount. This purchase is financed with the 
agent's own dollars or dollars bought in Chile's 
parallel market or with own dollars from abroad. 
This third possibility may amount to a repatria-
tion of capital. The person concerned then auth-
orizes a local bank to obtain the agreement of the 
Chilean debtor for the redenomination of the 
foreign debt in national currency. This bank sub-
mits an offer to the Central Bank for part of the 
monthly quota to be allocated to the highest 
bidder, stating how much it will pay for the 
conversion transaction. 
Once the Central Bank has given its appro-
val, the obligation is purchased and it is rede-
nominated in pesos by the local bank, thus 
creating a new domestic debt instrument. The 
foreign debt is cancelled and the new (indexed) 
instrument is delivered to a local agent. The 
bank's costs in obtaining the quota are passed on 
to the agent. The new debt is placed in the local 
market at about 92% of its value. The resulting 
amount is handed over to the agent. 
The advantage of chapter XVIII does not lie 
solely in the lower cost of local currency funds 
resulting from the difference between the dis-
counted and the nominal value of the note, less 
the cost of obtaining the quota and the difference 
between the parallel market exchange rate and 
the official rate used for the transaction, but also 
apart from the profit gained, in the possibility of 
laundering capital withdrawn from the country 
or from the public accounts of the enterprises. 
Chapter XIX authorizes individuals or legal 
entities, Chilean or foreign, resident or non-
resident, to invest in Chile by purchasing and 
using foreign debt instruments, with the right to 
use the foreign exchange market to send capital 
and profits abroad. This chapter has antecedents 
in the Decree with the Force of Law No. 600, 
which regulates direct foreign investment in 
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Chile and includes among its provisions the pos-
sibility of capitalizing duly authorized debts and 
non-remitted profits. Both types of capitaliza-
tion constitute an input of capital which carries 
with it the right of unlimited remittance and of 
repatriation after three years. 
Creditor banks can carry out transactions 
with their own notes or these notes may be 
bought at a discount by third parties in the secon-
dary market. The persons concerned must make 
an application to the Central Bank, identifying 
the applicant and describing clearly the pro-
posed investment. As in the previous case, an 
agreement is required stating that the debt will 
be paid in Chile on the terms indicated. Central 
Bank instruments do not require this agreement. 
In no case may the amount of the transactions 
exceed the value of the original instrument. 
Applications may be accepted or rejected by 
the Central Bank, which may make its approval 
subject to part of the investment being made 
with the proceeds of the sale of foreign exchange 
in the free market, but it has not so far done this. 
If it approves the application, the Central Bank 
may authorize remittance and repatriation; the 
profits may not be remitted during the first four 
years, and from the fifth year only 2 5 % of the 
net profits may be remitted. Profits obtained 
after the fifth year may be remitted without 
restriction. Capital may only be repatriated in 
the amount of the proceeds of the alienation of 
assets or rights corresponding to the original 
investment. Remittances are made at the bank 
exchange rate. The note is thus acquired by the 
agent and then redeemed by the original debtor 
in pesos at a discount of 10% of the nominal 
value. The investment is made with the 
proceeds. 
When the debtor is the Central Bank, the 
debts are converted into national currency notes 
at their nominal value and at the official 
exchange rate. Otherwise the terms are agreed in 
each case. The Central Bank holds the informa-
tion and controls remittance and repatriation. 
The legal guarantee of transactions under 
chapter XIX is an agreement with the Central 
Bank, unlike investments under Decree Law 
No. 600 which are guaranteed by a contract-law 
with the State. The general taxation schedule is 
applicable, and the possibility granted under 
Decree Law No. 600 to other forms of foreign 
investment to opt for tax exemption for 10 years 
is not available. There are no sectoral limitations 
and established or operating public or private 
enterprises may be acquired. There is no differ-
ence of treatment among sectors and conversion 
is not an alternative to special development 
schemes. There are no pre-established quantita-
tive limits, but each transaction must be 
approved by the Central Bank, and this enables 
the Bank to control the system (table 4). 
In August 1986 the Central Bank established 
a third method of capitalization, by means of 
which persons acquiring Chilean foreign debt 
instruments may apply them to the subscription 
and payment of shares issued by enterprises 
which need to increase their capital because of 
excessive debt. Chileans and foreigners may take 
advantage of this provision, which makes it dif-
ferent from chapter XVIII. There is no right of 
remittance or repatriation. These transactions 
are not subject to Central Bank quotas; therefore, 
no interest or taxes are payable on the value 
added. Another method is the recycling of the 
debt notes of public enterprises contracted with 
overseas suppliers to enable these enterprises to 
reduce their obligations. The foreign debt notes 
issued by enterprises such as Ferrocarriles, 
Endesa and the Metro which are not included in 
the renegotiation of the foreign debt can be 
transferred to the country and handed over to 
the Treasury, which will accept them at a larger 
discount than under chapters XVIII and XIX {El 
Mercurio, 15 August 1986). 
There are other methods of reducing the 
debt, such as forgiveness of part of it under a 
bilateral agreement; however, this does not 
amount to conversion of foreign debt. 
Up to February 1987 transactions under 
chapter XVIII amounted to US$594 million and 
under chapter XIX to US$441 million, to which 
could be added the capitalization of debts under 
DL 600, which are suspended. Transnational 
corporations have preferred to buy others' debt 
at lower prices, keeping their own debt in force. 
Transactions of this kind have been used for the 
purchase of enterprises and about half of them 
have been attributable to pension and insurance 
funds (table 5), with working capital included in 
the category. 
Some financial advisers and foreign banks 
have indicated the possibility of establishing an 
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international mutual fund in Chile with a view to 
attracting resources from insurance companies, 
pension funds and other institutional investors 
which want to invest in specialized portfolios (El 
Mercurio, 20 March 1987). At the same time, 
inputs are envisaged for investing these funds by 
means of chapter XIX transactions with foreign 
debt notes (La Epoca, 17 June 1987). These 
bodies may not own more than 5 % of the equity 
of a single issuer, nor may their investments in 
an enterprise exceed 10% of the Fund's assets. 
Remittance of profits will be subject to a single 
income tax of 10%. 
c) Mexico 
The Mexican capitalization programme 
started up in April 1986. Foreign investors may 
buy foreign debt of the public sector at a discount 
in the secondary and exchange markets at the 
official peso exchange rate for use in authorized 
investments. It may also be swapped for Mexi-
can Treasury notes which are traded in the 
market to obtain local currency. 
The debt is redeemed at 70 to 100% of its 
nominal value, depending on the purpose for 
which the pesos obtained in the transaction are 
to be used. The authorized purposes include the 
purchase of enterprises which are being privat-
ized; repayment of loans in pesos to Mexico's 
nationalized banks; prepayment in pesos of 
Ficorca2 obligations; and payments to national 
suppliers. The highest priority, and therefore 
the lowest discount, applies to the sale of 
selected State enterprises and new investments 
exchange insurance scheme of the Bank of Mexico. 
Table 4 
CHILE: FOREIGN DEBT NOTE TRANSACTIONS, BY TRANSACTION TYPE 
(Millions of dollars) 
A. Public sector (a+b+c+d) 
a) Central Bank 
- New funds 
• 1983/198-1 rescheduling 
- Others 
b) Srate Bank 
- 1983/1984 rescheduling 
- Others 
c) Public enterprises 
d) Private sector with 
public guarantees 
- 1983/1984 rescheduling of 
private financial sector 
B. Private sector (a+b) 
a) Private financial sector 
- Article 14 loans 
b) Private enterprises sector 
- Article 14 loans 
- Others 
Total (A + B) 
Capitalization 
1U600 + others 
M¡iy August Feb. 
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Table 5 
CHILE: SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION OF DEBT 
CAPITALIZATION TRANSACTIONS UNDER 
CHAPTER XIX, MID-1985 TO 
OCTOBER 1986 
(Millions of dollars and percentages) 
Sector" 































Source: Central Bank of Chile. 
"Increases in working capital have been included in the 
enterprises' sectoral category. 
or capital widening which generate exports, 
reduce imports and create jobs, or are located in 
special zones (World Financial Markets, August 
1986, pp. 11 and 12). The funds may not be used 
for working capital, except in support of an 
increased capitalization programme (Business 
Latin America, 1 August, pp. 270 and 271). 
Although in principle Mexican companies 
may not use the programme, in two cases already 
contracts have been signed through subsidiaries 
of Mexican companies abroad (Financial Times, 
5 January 1987). It has recently been confirmed 
that local firms may participate, with priority 
given first to export companies and then to 
subcontractors and tourism companies. Transac-
tions in 1987 were below US$1 200 million 
(Business Latin America, 9 February 1987, and 
The Economist, 1 March 1987). 
All the transactions require authorization 
from the Economics Ministry and the National 
Foreign Investment Council. Once the conver-
sion has been approved, an additional complica-
tion comes into play. The proceeds in local 
currency are deposited in the Treasury and dis-
bursed directly to suppliers, creditors and con-
tractors on presentation of the corresponding 
documentation. 
The approved investments cannot guaran-
tee profits not related to their income levels and 
effective profits, and the terms of the conversion 
of the instrument may not be more favourable 
than those of the original loan (IMF, 1986). The 
remittance of profits in the first five years may 
not exceed the interest on the original debt. 
Capital may not be repatriated for 12 years (Bus-
iness Latin America, 20 April 1987). 
The Mexican programme was suspended in 
February 1987 owing to lack of progress in the 
renegotiation of the foreign debt. Half of the 60 
banks (mostly in the United States) which had 
refused to commit new funds in the renegotia-
tion will not be able to participate in the conver-
sion programme (Business Latin America, 18 
March 1987). Moreover, in order to offset the 
inflationary impact of the programme, it has 
been limited to US$100 million per month 
(América Economía, No. 4, 1987, p. 28). 
d) Costa Rica 
Costa Rica's capitalization programme 
began in August 1986; it includes tax exemp-
tions for investment in priority sectors, such as 
those which generate non-traditional exports, 
tourism and the new free zones in which assem-
bly work for export is being developed. The first 
investments were in the banana industry, the 
financial sector and flower growing (South, 
December 1986). The Central Bank considers 
applications case by case and pays up to 70% of 
the nominal value; the bonds which are issued 
are sold at a discount. There are no restrictions 
on the immediate remittance of profits. Repatri-
ation of capital may begin only after a period 
equivalent to the term of the original debt (Busi-
ness Latin America, 20 April 1987). The possi-
bility has been indicated of establishing a plan 
for buying Costa Rica's foreign debt notes at a 
discount of 25% (lower than commercial dis-
count) for forest conservation projects (Umaña, 
1987). Up to May 1987 transactions amounting 
to US$83 million had been processed, and no 
new operations are envisaged for the moment. 
e) Philippines 
Detailed regulations concerning the conver-
sion programme of the Philippines were pub-
lished in August 1986; the programme is open to 
114 CEPAL REVIEW No. 32 / August ¡987 
local and foreign investors. Almost all the exter-
nal public debt and most of the private debt can 
be traded. The notes are swapped by the Central 
Bank at the official exchange rate, provided that 
the proceeds are used for investment in selected 
economic sectors, each of which has its own 
priority. 
The sectors receiving preferential treatment 
include industries producing exportable goods, 
the farm sector, construction and health and 
education services. In these sectors there are no 
restrictions on the remittance of profits, and 
capital can be repatriated in quotas after the first 
three years. The terms are different in the other 
sectors of the economy. The Central Bank 
charges 10% —and not 5%— on the transac-
tion's value; profits may be remitted only after 
four years and the repatriation of capital may not 
begin until the sixth year. These investments 
also require new funds equivalent to 10% of the 
value of the converted debt. 
The Central Bank has received applications 
amounting to US$220 million, but up to October 
1986 it had approved only 19 transactions 
amounting to US$33 million (Euromoney, Feb-
ruary 1987). 
It has also been reported that the capital of 
the commercial financial system and of the coun-
try's 50 biggest companies amounts to around 
US$6 000 million or a little less than a quarter of 
the debt. Conversion could therefore result in a 
foreign takeover of the economy. 
The Philippines has recently proposed 
another conversion system: Philippine invest-
ment notes. Banks are offered the option of 
converting the above-LIBOR margin of their 
interest payments into these notes instead of 
money. These are foreign debt dollar instru-
ments, without interest, maturing in six years 
(The Economist, 14 March 1987). 
f) Ecuador 
At the beginning of December 1986 the 
Monetary Board issued resolution 395/86, 
approving a capitalization system limited to the 
private foreign debt which was "securitized" in 
1986 in a programme which was subsequently 
incorporated in the consolidation of Ecuador's 
foreign debt with the banks in August 1986. Its 
ceiling is US$1 346 million (Expreso, 5 
December 1986). 
Nationals and foreigners may buy notes, 
which will be acquired by the Central Bank at 
their nominal value less a commission. The Cen-
tral Bank will deliver local currency to the agent 
making the capital investment, thereby cancel-
ling the private debt. There will be no monetari-
zation in this programme: credits will be 
exchanged against debt of equivalent value. The 
Central Bank will be exempt from granting new 
loans to replace those paid back by means of 
capitalization (Análisis Semanal, 19 December 
1986). 
Each contract signed will spell out the limits 
on remittance of profits and repatriation of capi-
tal (Business Latin America, 5 December 1986). 
Profits may not be remitted until the fifth year or 
capital repatriated for 12 years (Business Latin 
America, 20 April 1987). The capital may not be 
repatriated within a period shorter than the one 
set out in the amortization schedule in the agree-
ment on consolidation of the foreign debt. 
This transaction is singularly attractive for 
banks and financiers which need to improve 
their debt ratio. There are no other restrictions 
except those governing foreign investment. 
Resolution 395/86 indicates the possibility of 
establishing priority sectors, but it is not known 
whether this will be done by general regulation 
or individual decisions. However, the capitaliza-
tion agreement contains an intrinsic selectivity 
criterion. It is not applicable to the formation of 
new businesses but only to the conversion of 
debt into equity; if there is no debt, there can be 
no conversion. The first conversion transaction 
was completed at the end of March 1987. 
g) Venezuela 
Debt conversion is governed by Decree 1521 
of 1987, but several aspects are left blank, and 
these will probably be clarified when the Decree 
is implemented. The conversion may be effected 
by means of capitalization of foreign loans, con-
version of foreign public debt into foreign 
investment, and conversion of foreign public 
debt into national investment. This latter 
method will be supervised by a special commis-
sion, for which the Superintendent of Foreign 
Investments will act as executive secretary. 
Applicants have to undertake not to remit prof-
its amounting to more than 10% of the capital 
for three years; capital may not be repatriated 
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during the first five years, and during the next 
eight years the maximum repatriation will be 
12.5%; there are no restrictions on repatriation 
after 13 years. 
Conversion into foreign investment may be 
authorized when the investment is intended for 
imports substitution or exports promotion, or to 
prevent the collapse of enterprises or when it is 
for use in the agriculture and agro-industry sec-
tors, road and railway infrastructure works, tour-
ism, construction of social housing, domestic 
transport, capital goods, chemical and petro-
chemical products, electronics and informatics, 
biotechnology, and aluminium and its process-
ing. Other sectors may be approved. 
Once the conversion has been authorized, 
the Central Bank will buy from the investor 
notes representing foreign public debt and it will 
supply him with local currency with which to 
make the authorized investment. Alternatively, 
the Central Bank will furnish domestic public 
debt instruments. The purchase or guaranteed 
value of the notes will be the nominal value, 
although discounts may be introduced. 
For the conversion of foreign public debt 
into national investment the Central Bank will 
buy notes from public enterprises and pay them 
in cash or with bonds at an exchange rate to be 
established. Lastly, the capitalization of external 
loans in debtor enterprises will be governed by 
Decree 1200, which regulates foreign invest-
ments in general. 
A general condition for the purchase by the 
Central Bank of foreign public debt notes is that 
they shall be converted into domestic debt on 
financial terms equal or better for the debtor. 
On the same date the Economics Ministry 
and the Central Bank issued an exchange rate 
agreement which set the rate for the three tran-
sactions at 14.4925 bolívares to the dollar (Latin 
America Weekly Report, 11 June 1987). 
h) Honduras 
In June 1987 the Government of Honduras 
approved a foreign debt conversion operation 
amounting to US$6 million. The Central Bank 
swaps the notes into local currency at 100% of 
their nominal value. The local currency is depos-
ited in national banks and may be used only to 
finance local investment costs. 
Export projects may use the system, in 
which case the foreign exchange used for remit-
tance of profits must come from the export earn-
ings of the company concerned. Projects of 
considerable benefit for the country may also use 
the system, including probably the privatization 
of certain public enterprises (Latin America 
Weekly Report, 11 June 1987). 
i) Argentina 
In May 1987 Argentina established a public 
foreign debt conversion programme, the main 
feature of which is the requirement of invest-
ment of new funds, which must be at least equal 
to 100% of the nominal value of the debt to be 
converted. 
There is the possibility of integrating the 
dollar by means of a direct investment of the 
foreign currency, a six-year loan or application of 
Bonex'87 at 96% of its nominal value. In all 
cases a dollar is brought in directly from abroad, 
but there are other less rigid systems for includ-
ing the additional dollar. Only 50% of the new 
funds may be integrated through capital depos-
ited in the investment fund or loans obtained 
from the International Finance Corporation. 
The system permits the integration of the new 
funds by means of foreign exchange spent on the 
import of investment goods and equipment. 
Conversion applications will be valued and 
selected by public bidding, and the preference 
given to projects will depend on the ratio of the 
new funds required to the debt to be converted. 
Priority will be given to proposals offering a 
larger input of dollars. 
The agent will have to undertake to use the 
local currency to buy equipment or construct 
factories or other work which increase the pro-
ductive capacity and the net supply of goods. 
Consideration will also be given to investment 
proposals designed to enhance the efficiency and 
productivity and increase the supply of services, 
especially those which strengthen the balance of 
payments. Permission will not be given for stock 
market investments financed by the conversion 
or for funding privatization or investment under 
the Houston Plan (petroleum). 
The conversion operates only with foreign 
currency already processed through other mech-
anisms and this currency may not be used for the 
transfer of existing assets. Consideration is still 
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being given to the possibility of using conversion 
to cancel loans obtained through rediscount by 
the Central Bank {El Clarín, ed. int., 1-7 June 
1987). 
. Investments by foreigners will be subject to 
prior approval of the investment under the 1980 
law on foreign investments. Proposais will not 
be-accepted if they involve the transfer of blocks 
of stock which affect domestic security or are 
designed to increase the supply in economic sec-
tors which require rationalization. 
The administrative period for approval of 
the projects before the bidding is 45 days. 
The additional funds will have to be brought ' 
in before or at the same time as the conversion 
for projects of up to one million dollars, and in 
other cases the transaction will be made in accor-
dance with the approved time-table. The inves-
tor must deposit a guarantee with the local 
acting bank or put up a bank guarantee; the same 
bank will be responsible for acting at all stages of 
the bidding and of the programme in general. 
Once the deposit has been produced —equal 
to 3% a year on the outstanding balance of 
additional funds— the Central Bank will convert 
the obligations into local currency at the agreed 
prices. The exchange rate used will be the closing 
buyer's rate of the Banco de la Nación Argentina 
on the day. The resulting amount will be depos-
ited in the local acting bank and the converted 
obligation will be extinguished. 
The bank will release the deposits in accor-
dance with the agreed schedule and the guaran-
tees will be released in amounts equal to the 
converted percentage of the total transaction. 
The same bank will notify the Central Bank of 
the completion of the transaction. 
In the event of non-completion within 60 
days the investor will lose the guarantee. If the 
non-completion is partial, the loss will be so as 
well. If the additional funds are not brought in, 
the total guarantee is lost, as is the right to effect 
the remainder of the agreed conversion. Sanc-
tions will also be imposed. 
The acting bank will also monitor the use of 
the deposit for the project. The additional funds 
will have to be furnished in accordance with a 
time-table proposed by the investor and used in 
the project in the proportion which served as the 
basis for the approval. The bank will also issue 
the necessary certificates, approvals and verifica-
tions to ensure the correct and timely use of the 
funds in the approved investment project. 
The programme envisages investments of 
around US$4 000 million over five years, of 
which half will be financed by conversion and 
half by the entry of additional funds from abroad, 
either as investment of capital or as medium-
and long-term loans. 
j) Other countries 
A special case of swapping has been estab-
lished by Peru, which has begun negotiations for 
the exchange of foreign debt notes for goods. 
Two-thirds of non-traditional exports may be 
paid for in foreign exchange and the remaining 
third in Peruvian foreign debt notes. A transac-
tion totalling US$20 million was carried out in 
Dacember 1986, when a United States bank 
accepted asparagus and minerals instead of for-
eign currency {Latin America Weekly Report, 9 
April 1987). 
The Government of Bolivia made an official 
offer to the bank which heads the committee for 
that country to but at a discount of 90% the 
US$671 million owed to 128 commercial banks 
{Latin America Weekly Report, 9 April 1987, 
and Business Latin America, 25 May 1987). It 
has recently been reported that transactions 
were being performed for repurchase of public 
debt at a discount of 75% {América Economía, 
No. 4, 1987). 
Jamaica has announced its intention to 
establish a programme for converting into 
equity up to US$100 million of foreign debt with 
commercial banks. These transactions may be 
used for new investments in factories and hotels 
{The Journal of Commerce, 25 May 1987). 
In Colombia there have been hints of the 
possibility of initiating a capitalization pro-
gramme using bank debt, for the discount on the 
rest of this country's debt would not be sufficient 
to get such a programme off the ground {Busi-
ness Latin America, 22 September 1986). 
The Dominican Republic is exploring the 
possibility of permitting the conversion of debt 
into equity. Guatemala is expected to announce 
shortly a debt-to-equity conversion plan, espe-
cially with respect to the stabilization bonds 
callable in 1988 and 1989. 
In Nigeria notes for non-secured unpaid 
obligations may be redeemed in local currency on 
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terms agreed between the holders and the Cen-
tral Bank. If the approved long-term investment 
is actually made with the proceeds of this tran-
saction, it will be treated as if it has been made in 
foreign currency with respect to taxation of rem-
ittance of profits and repatriation of capital 
{International Capital Markets, December 
1986). 
3. Other developments 
a) The Japanese corporation in the Cayman 
Islands 
The 28 main Japanese banks which have lent 
to Latin America have established a company 
—JBA Investment Inc.— in the tax haven of the 
Cayman Islands to buy their own debt notes at a 
discount. The discount is established by thejapa-
nese Centre for International Finance, a semi-
State body set up to examine the situation of the 
holder countries. 
The banks can offset the resulting capital 
losses against their taxes. The new body receives 
payments of capital and interest on the original 
terms; the amounts received are distributed to 
the banks as profits (Euromoney, April 1987). 
JBA Investment will begin operations by 
buying Mexican notes representing US$13 000 
million of the total of US$36 000 million owed 
by the region to Japanese banks.ò The new com-
pany's first goal will be to sell the loans totalling 
US$830 million made to Mexico in 1983. Opera-
tions will then continue with other public debt of 
Mexico or other countries. 
Some of the possible consequences of this 
initiative are as follows: 
— Increased pressure for the creation of a 
multilateral system of the same kind by means, 
for example, of the establishment of a subsidiary 
of the World Bank specializing in the purchase 
of third-world debt at a discount (Business Latin 
America, 25 May 1987). 
— The Japanese Banks are very large credi-
tors to the region and a large-scale operation in 
this market will affect the unity of the creditors, 
which has so often been contrasted with the 
disunity of the debtors. 
'The debt of other countries with Japanese banks is as fol-
lows, in descending order: Brazil US$11 000 million; Argentina 
USS5 500 million; Venezuela US$4 300 million; Chile US$1 800 
million. 
— The discount rate applied by this body to 
the sale of the debt will either be limited to the 
secondary market rates or, what is more likely, it 
will be a different rate, in which case the existing 
market will be seriously affected. 
— In the medium term the Japanese body 
will be able to begin other activities, such as debt 
swap transactions, and even play an active role in 
debt renegotiation. 
— The competitive capacity of the Japanese 
banks will be improved in the opposite direction 
to the one envisaged in the Baker Plan, for it will 
be easier for these banks to de-link themselves 
from Latin America. 
— There may possibly be an increase in 
direct investment by Japan in Latin America. 
b) Mutual Funds 
The International Finance Corporation (a 
subsidiary of the World Bank) is urging the 
debtor countries to form a stock market for for-
eign investment and establish national mutual 
funds in which foreign investments can be made. 
Doubts persist as to who should manage the 
funds, the taxes to be levied and the type of 
shares which might be bought by such funds 
(The Economist, 1 March 1987). 
As stated earlier, Brazil and Chile are exa-
mining the possibility of permitting the conver-
sion of debt into special mutual funds for stock 
market investment. 
c) Conversion transactions outside the official 
programme 
Lastly, it must be pointed out that, in addi-
tion to the programmes of agreements initiated 
and approved by the economic authorities of the 
debtor countries, some creditor banks have 
swapped notes for capital in private transactions 
(IMF, 1986). So far most of these transactions 
have concerned Mexico. 
At the end of April authorization was 
expected for a debt-equity swap between the 
Grupo Industrial Alfa —the country's main pri-
vate corporation— and the creditor banks, 
which was granted in December 1986. The tran-
saction will cover a foreign debt of US$920 mil-
lion to be exchanged for 45% of the group's 
shares, plus US$25 million in cash and the pur-
chase of US$200 million of public debt (Council 
of the Americas, 1987, and Financial Times, 10 
April 1987). 
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III 
A provisional assessment 
1. The balance of payments 
The question as to whether a conversion system 
helps the balance of payments can be examined 
from several perspectives. The first question 
ought to be about the advantage of repaying 
ahead of time debt for which normal servicing 
has been suspended or restricted by several coun-
tries and which represents a large proportion of 
the total debt. The banks have been gradually 
accepting the possibility of relatively large par-
dons. Debt extinguished by conversion could not 
take advantage of any changes in the renego-
tiated terms. 
Conversion reduces the amount of the debt 
and improves slightly the country's negotiating 
position with its creditors, but there should be no 
illusions about the early restoration of the flow 
of capital to Latin America. The reduction of the 
debt will not create a new supply of credit and in 
this sense it will not be beneficial. 
From another perspective, the operation 
does not offer a global solution to the debt prob-
lem, nor has anyone suggested that it does. It is 
sufficient to compare the volume of cumulative 
direct foreign investment in the region 
—US$60 000 million at the end of 1985— with 
that year's debt, which amounted to US$368 000 
million. It would be necessary to increase six-fold 
the present volume of foreign investment to 
bring it up to the level of the debt, even though 
the ratio would clearly be smaller if discounts are 
applied to the debt. 
Conversion of the debt reduces the amount 
of annual interest, and this helps the national 
balance of payments. However, there are two 
opposite effects which can impair —or even 
reverse— this result. The reduction in the debt 
through conversion is offset by the decline in 
real foreign investment caused by this fictitious 
investment; it must be remembered that there is 
no inflow of foreign exchange. 
Furthermore, the investment generates 
future obligations, including remittance and 
repatriation, which might be greater than the 
original payment of debt even though occurring 
at a later stage. Since the purchase prices of the 
assets are established in a period of recession 
—in which they are the prices which offer the 
best possibility of investment— it is very possi-
ble that the converted capital may prove more 
profitable than the medium-term interest rate. 
In fact, the net effect of conversion on the coun-
try's balance of payments is neither simple nor 
positive. In the long term, the control exercised 
by the banks over real assets will probably mean 
repatriation of capital, for the banks will not 
wish to retain these assets indefinitely. 
Lastly, the fact that the notes are paid at a 
discount involves a paradox: the conversion 
checks the rise in the discount rate for the notes 
and in some cases it would seem to have reversed 
this upward trend; the discount rate does not rise 
any further —or even falls— by virtue of the 
willingness of the countries to pay the debt at 
this level. 
2. Direct foreign investment 
Given the decline in direct foreign investment in 
the region and the associated gloomy outlook, it 
would be useful to have an effective incentive for 
attracting such investment. 
A careful judgement must be made as to 
whether it is worth losing the positive effect of 
direct foreign investment on the region's econ-
omy in exchange for an insignificant improve-
ment in the foreign debt situation. The 
conversion system must be evaluated in the con-
text of a national policy for foreign investment, 
for otherwise it will merely be a question of 
liberalization and reduction of this investment 
under another heading; the widespread use of 
the capitalization system would be one more 
factor in the reduction of restrictions on foreign 
investment which is taking place in Latin Amer-
ica, a process which certainly ceased long ago to 
have much incentive effect. 
If optimum investment results are not 
expected from the conversion scheme, it can be 
used for many different purposes, including the 
acquisition of working capital or replacement of 
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Table 6 
ESTIMADES DEBT OF SUBSIDIARIES OF 
UNITED STATES T R A N S N A T I O N A L 
CORPORATIONS, 1977 A N D 1982 
(Thousands of millions of dollars) 
I. Foreign debt 
a) Long-term 
With parent companies 
With other foreigners 
b) Short-term 
With parent companies 
With other foreigners 
II. Debt with bodies in 
the recipient country 
a) Long-term 
b) Short-term 


























Source: Estimates of the United Nations Centre on Transnational 
Corporations in "Foreign direct investment in Latin 
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local loans. Not all transfers of assets result in 
greater productive capacity in the national econ-
omy, nor is foreign investment equally advan-
tageous in all economic sectors. It might even 
stimulate unnecessary operations which do not 
increase national investment, such as the pur-
chase of assets for subsequent resale, all on less 
explicit terms than before. The quantitative 
effect of diverting the investment might have 
unfavourable qualitative implications. 
If the flows resulting from conversion are 
considered to have the benefits of direct foreign 
investment, a paradoxical situation is created. A 
foreign currency transaction carried out abroad, 
as a result of which local assets are bought with 
cheap local money and at a discount, provides 
rights equivalent to those resulting from a tran-
saction using risk capital in foreign currency 
effectively brought into the country which in the 
short terms increases the country's productive 
capacity. 
Conversion can become a subsidy for shifted 
investment, which would have taken place in any 
case without the conversion (IMF, 1986). There 
is an implicit subsidy when a transnational cor-
poration with x million dollars buys x3 million 
in pesos to invest today and remit tomorrow 
from the region. 
From another standpoint, this situation con-
centrates on one factor of direct foreign invest-
ment —the capital— but it disregards others, 
such as technology and exporting capacity. 
The foreign debt of the transnational corpo-
rations in the region amounted to US$38 100 
million, of which US$17 000 million was long-
term and US$5 300 million obligations to parent 
companies (table 6). However, it is interesting 
to note that, to judge by the available informa-
tion, the transnational corporations prefer to 
pay off their debts in full and purchase other 
cheap debt. 
Apart from special cases —such as the immi-
nent bankruptcy of viable enterprises— the pur-
chase of existing assets by transnational 
corporations brings no great benefit. Moreover, 
it can encourage speculation in the prices of the 
assets. 
3. Repatriation and laundering 
of capital 
In the case of the return of fugitive capital or the 
laundering of capital, there is a positive saving 
on the payment of interest without the disadvan-
tage of loss of foreign exchange through debt 
payments or subsequent remittance. Further-
more, the central bank can reserve to itself part 
of the discount when such a policy is in force. 
The repatriation of capital is a clear positive 
element. 
However, as far as can be determined from 
the available data and although we must await 
the relevant information before forming a final 
opinion, conversion is not producing a massive 
repatriation of capital. Indeed, the success of the 
system can lead to new flights of capital or 
revolving movements of capital, i.e., the removal 
of capital from the country for subsequent re-use 
in the country, followed by removal once again. 
The system implies using the repatriation of 
capital to pay in advance the foreign debt which 
otherwise might perhaps have been rescheduled 
over a longer term. There are other uses for this 
capital of greater priority for national develop-
ment (Arellano and Ramos, 1986). 
From another standpoint, conversion offers 
a new profitable opportunity to enterprises 
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which commit an illegal act in some cases or an 
act harmful to the country's development in oth-
ers. It has been said, perhaps with irony, that one 
of the advantages of converting the debt into 
foreign investment would be that when foreign-
ers buy local businesses, national financiers 
might become convinced that it was a good thing 
to invest ¡n the country itself instead of remit-
ting their funds abroad {Fortune, 18 August 
1986), and this might halt the flight of capital. 
From a perhaps extra-economic perspective, 
it may be wondered why the owners of assets 
abroad should be rewarded with capital gains, 
when for the same objective —the payment of 
the foreign debt as the main variable of eco-
nomic policy— real wages and public expendi-
ture fall, with harmful effects on the well-being 
of most of the population. 
4. Local finances 
One advantage of capitalization is that the debt 
is paid in local currency and not in foreign 
exchange. However, it is advanced payment of 
the debt and it is questionable whether this is 
justified in the present circumstances of most of 
the Latin American economies; the payment is 
financed from national savings or capital, which 
are diverted from other possible uses. This can 
lead to speculation or a merely transient 
improvement with respect to the assets and to 
juggling of capital gains among economic agents 
(Dornbusch, 1986a). 
From another perspective, if conversion 
results in an increased money supply, inflation 
may be stimulated. "When a foreign creditor 
exchanges its claim on an entity in a debtor 
country for equity in the same entity, no flows of 
funds are involved. Domestic monetary condi-
tions are unaffected... When local-currency funds 
are paid out in exchange for the foreign-currency 
debt being swapped, domestic liquidity will 
increase...", although the monetary expansion 
may be limited in various ways, one of them 
being the application of periodic installments or 
quotas (World Financial Markets, September 
1986). 
If the notes are exchanged for bonds which 
are converted into local currency in the secon-
dary market, the scheme will not have the same 
inflationary effect, always provided that the 
volume of transactions is relatively small in rela-
tion to the national money base. However, the 
programme can have an inflationary effect if the 
economic authorities do not try or are unable to 
neutralize the monetary impact of conversion. If 
the notes are exchanged directly for local cur-
rency in the central bank, the monetary authori-
ties should reduce the money supply by an 
equivalent amount to prevent an expansion of 
the money base. 
In the absence of clear incentives to direct 
the process towards investment, its main effect 
may be the allocation of budgetary resources to 
the financial system which is carrying out these 
transactions, which ultimately will become 
simply a form of financing and not a stimulus to 
genuine investment, which can be promoted 
with much better means applied more accurately 
(Dornbusch, 1986b). 
From the fiscal standpoint, it is possible that 
the domestic debt incurred by the redemption of 
the notes may bear more interest than the origi-
nal foreign debt. Furthermore, an effect of 
expulsion from the local financial market may 
occur. 
Lastly, one consideration of interest is the 
effect of conversion transactions on the 
exchange rate, especially with respect to the 
margin between the official and parallel rates. 
This will depend on the demand created by the 
conversion transactions and the supply of for-
eign exchange in the black market, funds which 
have not left the country but are not official 
either. 
5. Foreign control of the 
national economy 
If foreign direct investment is thought desirable, 
there will inevitably be a relative loss in eco-
nomic independence, which in an optimum 
situation will be offset by other advantages. The 
growth in direct foreign investment as a result of 
conversion may be viewed through the prism of 
cumulative investment of this kind throughout 
Latin America's history, which amounts to 
US$60 000 million. Potential conversion tran-
sactions might total US$20 000 million over a 
few years, which gives an idea of the magnitude 
of the possible transfers of assets if there are no 
restrictions. 
However, this is not just a problem of quan-
tity but also of quality. Today the supply of assets 
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is more indiscriminate —as a result of policy 
liberalization— and the costs are lower owing to 
the recession. However, the demand is con-
trolled partly by transnational corporations but 
With conversion there may have been disco-
vered a way of increasing national investment 
while reducing the country's foreign debt, with 
benefits for all the sectors involved. However, 
some modalities do give rise to problems in the 
way in which they are applied at present. 
The creditor banks gain from this operation, 
for they liquidate some risky debts —they would 
not otherwise sell their instruments at a 
discount— or exchange their financial assets 
directly for real assets. At the same time they 
continue to insist on the total repayment of the 
rest of the debt. Local residents who launder 
capital also benefit because they obtain for their 
dollars a higher local currency rate than in the 
parallel market. Foreign investors profit because 
they finance with cheap pesos —the difference 
between the face value and the value paid— the 
purchase of real assets at recession prices and 
their transactions enjoy some of the guarantees 
offered to foreign investment. Multilateral lend-
ing bodies approve because the debtor country 
thus gives priority to the main variable of real 
importance to them, namely the payment of the 
foreign debt. The country exchanges a debt of 
doubtful origin and problematical recoverability 
for a certain debt, which is paid by diverting 
funds which might be used for other purposes, 
by transferring real assets to new owners or by 
reducing its working capital. 
From another standpoint, conversion makes 
it impossible to monitor or audit the part of the 
foreign debt which is capitalized, owing to the 
superimposition of a commercial transaction 
involving third parties. This is important in 
those countries in which there has been criticism 
of the legitimacy of the debt as well as of the 
efficiency of its use. 
In some cases this amounts to a burdensome 
method of reducing the foreign debt which can 
also by transnational banks in which the han-
dling of assets is by definition transitory. Is it the 
best situation when the biggest banks manage on 
a transitory basis some of the best local assets? 
have major collateral effects. In order to attain 
the country's objectives —re-entry of capital and 
increased productive foreign investment— spe-
cial policies, of benefit both to the countries and 
to their creditors, should be put into effect in 
order to increase foreign investment in specific 
sectors and not merely to reduce the debt. 
It is also clear that the various conversion 
schemes are very different in nature. It makes no 
difference whether the proceeds of the conver-
sion are used for directly productive purposes, 
involve new capital, increase the production 
capacity and are directed toward sectors which 
generate exports, or whether, on the contrary, 
these proceeds are freely available —including 
for speculative purposes—, do not involve new 
funds and are used mostly for the purchase of 
existing assets. 
It is beneficial to swap unproductive obliga-
tions for investment opportunities, especially 
when the future of foreign investment is uncer-
tain (Weinert, 1986/1987) but the proof of the 
benefit to the nation is not the dynamism of the 
process, if the initial conditions are unsuitable. 
The main United States banks have recog-
nized that risky investments in the third world 
have lost their parity value. It might therefore be 
necessary to recognize the value of the debt 
market. The reduced face value of the debt 
represents the market value of the regional for-
eign debt, but this is a market with peculiar 
features. Why pay more than the real price of the 
debt? According to the secondary market in 
promissory notes, the real value of the notes is at 
least a third below their face value. 
From another perspective, it is difficult to 
understand how Latin America's creditor banks 
earn money be dealing in notes at one price 
while at the same time requiring the payment of 
other notes at higher prices. The creditor banks 
IV 
Conclusions and future possibilities 
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cannot continue negotiating the total payment 
of the interest owed and carrying out multilat-
eral rescheduling with governments while they 
are actively participating in the secondary 
market in discounted notes. The multilateral 
bodies and the governments of the central coun-
tries cannot continue to insist on payment of the 
nominal value of the debt while at the same time 
commending the conversion mechanism. 
Moreover, it is important to note the terms 
on which conversion is acceptable. In the case of 
conversion into foreign investment it is impor-
tant to determine what foreign investment is 
needed. If the conversion is to work properly, it 
must be governed by a selective and efficient 
policy and not based on differential terms which 
produce unreal solutions. It might be possible to 
require an infusion of new capital proportional 
to the capital of the conversion and to encourage 
investment in the production of tradeable goods, 
r e s t r i c t ing inves tmen t in financial 
intermediation. 
Conversion operations might be made the 
responsibility of a Latin American fund which 
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